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EMINENT DOMAIN: EXPLOITATION OF MONTANA'S
NATURAL RESOURCES
James M. Kaze
Amidst growing nation-wide concern over the protection and wise
use of the natural resources of the United States, Montana has both
moved and failed to move in the direction of complete supervisory con-
trol of her abundant natural resources. As with many other areas deal-
ing with public versus private concern, an intricate balancing of interests
must be made when considering the exploitation of natural resources.
This comment will attempt to expose some of the efforts made by Mon-
tana to balance these interests, with specific reference to the power of
eminent domain and its role in the effective use of natural resources.'
THE PAST
AN HISTORICAL LOOK AT EMINENT DOMAIN
2
While the title eminent domain was not placed upon the power of
the sovereign to take private property until centuries later, probably
the first encounter with the effects of its exercise was during the height
of the Roman Empire. 3 Any trace of the use of the power of eminent
domain disappeared for several centuries after the fall of the Roman
Empire.4 With the Medieval Period came the loss of individual prop-
erty rights. No need for a power such as eminent domain existed. All
property was vested in the sovereign.5 Only with the rise of individual
ownership of property did the power of eminent domain once again
become important.
The rise of individual property rights in England most markedly
influenced the concept of eminent domain as it is known today. The
common law version of the power found its roots in a concept called
"inquest of office."6 This jury concept was especially used to obtain
'Obviously, the effects of the exercise of the power of eminent domain on the use of
all of Montana's natural resources cannot be explored in a single comment. There-
fore, the efforts of the author will be directed toward two areas more recently sub-
ject to legislative scrutiny-minerals and water.
'To fully comprehend the complex theory of eminent domain is not the object of this
comment. However, a probe into the ancient history of this sovereign power should
guide the reader in understanding the constitutional limitations placed upon the
power in more recent times.
3NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 1.2 at 1-55 (3d ed.). During this period of history,
one also recalls that the Romans were avid engineers, building a myriad of complex
aqueduct systems for the transportation of water and sewerage to and from their
cities. This may be the first evidence of the organized exercise of eminent domain
by a sovereign for the exploitation of the most important of all natural resources.
'1d. § 1.2 at 1-56.
'Id. With the lack of regard for individual rights, a lack of demand for public im-
provements also existed.
ONICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.21[1] at 1-59. Inquest of office was an inquiry by
jurors into any matter which entitled the King to possession of lands, tenements,
goods, and chattels. It was originally invoked in cases of escheat and forfeiture.
1
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private lands for new highways, and jury awards of damages for such
takings were common.7 As early as 1544 A.D., the municipal corporation
of London was empowered by Parliament to enter upon and appropriate
private property for purposes of securing a water supply for the city.8
Flood prevention and drainage of lowlands also became an object of
eminent domain.9 The power of eminent domain was, thus, well estab-
lished by the time the first American states were colonized. However,
the familiar American limitation on the power of eminent domain-that
private property may only be taken, without consent, for public use-
did not and does not exist in English law. 10 The English version recog-
nizes the exercise of the power for any purpose tending to promote the
public welfare. 0l .1
The American colonies were, of course, greatly influenced by the
English law of eminent domain. The colonies first turned to the inquest-
of-office concept for exercising the power for the primary purpose
recognized at that time-roads. "  The first pre-Revolution use of the
power of eminent domain for the exploitation of natural resources had
the ring of commercialism, rather than of consumptive use. Second only
to providing roads, the operation of mills was an important object of
eminent domain.' 2 The statutes of at least seven colonies allowed the
taking of private property for purposes of damming the water of streams
in order to operate mills.1 2. 1 In providing in this way for the operation
of mills, the northern colonies differed from the southern colonies in the
procedures for condemnation. 3 The difference in procedure led to two
distinct methods of taking private property for public use, by admini-
strative order or by judicial decree. Although modified in form, this
distinction remains today.' 3 '1
The colonies had no constitutions per se. Without constitutional
limitation, eminent domain existed as an inherent power of the sovereign
to appropriate private property for any purpose designed to promote
lid., § 1.21[2] at 1-59.
8id., § 1.2113] at 1-61.
9STATUTE OF SEwFRs, 23 Hen. VIII, c. 5. See also, NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.2114]
at 1-61 to 1-63, where reference is made to author Robert Callis and his Reading
upon the Statute of Sewers, dated 1622 A.D. Note that Callis' objection to the
taking of private property for private use was grounded, not in individual property
rights, but in terms of the use of public funds for private benefit.
'0NICHOLS, 8Upra note 3, § 1.21[5] at 1-64, and LEwIs, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 1 at
3(3d ed.).
1o.'id.
UNICHOLS, sU ra note 3, § 1.22[1] at 1-65.
-Id., § 1.22[8] at 1-70.
"-id.
IId., § 1.22[12] at 1-71 to 1-72. Massachusetts, for example, effected the taking
of private property without judicial proceedings with the right to damages being
dependent upon institution of proceedings by the damaged landowner. In contrast,
most southern colonies required the condemnor to institute condemnation proceedings
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the public good, subject only to the moral obligation to make compen-
sation to the injured owner.' 4 Thus, the power of eminent domain, prior
to the creation of the Union, existed basically in its purist form. Upon
gaining statehood, all states of the Union became vested with all those
powers inherent in the sovereign, including the power of eminent
domain.15
This trace of history reveals the beginnings of a necessary power
of sovereignty. The exercise of the power to exploit natural resources,
however, does not become evident until the history of the power in the
western states-Montana, in particular-is explored.
MONTANA'S HISTORICAL ViEW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
[Eminent domain is] not a reserved, but an inherent right, a right
which pertains to sovereignty as a necessary, constant and inextin-
guishable attribute.'
Basic to any understanding of the historical significance of the
evolution of eminent domain is the absolute nature of the power in the
sovereign. The power exists in the sovereign without statutory or con-
stitutional recognition; any statutory or constitutional statements of
the power exist merely as a limitation on the exercise of the power, or
as a procedure for its exercise.
7
(A) Territorial Laws
Even prior to statehood, the Montana Territory had statutes defining
and "granting" the power of eminent domain. In the two pre-1889
codifications of Montana territorial laws, eminent domain was defined
as ". . . the right of the people or the government to take private prop-
erty for public use."' s The territorial legislature also listed those uses
considered to be public uses. Among those things considered to be public
uses for which eminent domain could be exercised were: canals, flumes,
ditches, etc., for public transportation, for supplying mines and farms
with water, and for draining and reclaiming lands; canals, flumes, ditches,
etc., for the use of county, city, and school district inhabitants; stream
protection; floating logs on nonnavigable streams; tailing outlets and
ditches, flumes, pipes and dumping places for working mines; and
"NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.22[14] at 1-73, and Lawis, supra note 10. This defini-
tion of eminent domain becomes important to later discussions of public use in this
comment and should be characterized as the unrestricted form of the power.
"NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.23[1] and [2] at 1-73 and 1-74. Incidentally, one
should note that the federal government did not clearly have the power of eminent
domain until 1875 when recognized in Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367. Id. § 1.24 at 1-75
to 1-76.
"6LEwis, supra note 10, § 2 at 7.
17See, NIcTOLS, supra note 3, § 1.24[5] at 1-77 and § 1.3 at 1-78, and LEwIS, supra
note 10, § 10 at 21.
"REVISED STATUTES OF MONTANA, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 579 (1879) and Com-
PILED STATUTES OF MONTANA, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 597 (1887).
1974]
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sewerage of cities and public buildings. 19 This early list of public
uses made constant reference to uses of water. The importance of the
mining industry at that time is also evident from this legislative list
of public uses for which eminent domain could be exercised. Since the
right to exercise the power cannot exist in private persons or corpora-
tions without a franchise from the sovereign, 20 the territorial legislature
granted a form of condemnation power to road, ditch, telegraph, fluming,
and railroad corporations and to owners of mining claims.
21
(B) The 1889 Convention
Gentlemen: It is with much pleasure that I call this convention to
order, a convention that meets the purpose of framing a constitution
for one of the largest states in the Union, the great gold and silver
state of Montana."
The framers of the 1889 Constitution were not unaware of the im-
portance of Montana's water and mineral resources. They, likewise,
were not ignorant of the condemnation power and its relationship to
those resources. Amidst the recorded debates on women's suffrage and
temperance, the framers of Montana's first constitution found the prob-
lem of the adequacy of water for irrigation of supreme importance.
2
3
Since the adequacy of water for irrigation depends to some extent on
the condemnation power to secure means of transportation from stream
to field, the nature of ownership-public or private-of water became
'id., § 580 and § 598, respectively.
"There may be some question as to whether a territory of the United States is a sov-
ereign with such inherent powers as eminent domain. However, Nichols in his work
on eminent domain, supra note 3, § 1.23[3] at 1-74, suggests that, where the Con-
gressional enabling act organizing the territory grants the power of legislation ex-
tending to all matters properly the subject of legislation, it has been held that the
power of eminent domain has also been conferred upon the territorial government.
Citing, People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Assoc., 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1946).
Just how this 1946 decision relates to previous territories such as Montana is unclear.
21
REVISED STATUTES Or MONTANA, GENERAL LAWS, §§ 285, 307 and 887 (1879); and
COMPILED STATUTES Or MONTANA, GENERAL LAWS, §§ 487, 685 and 1496 (1887).
The important point to make here is the character of the corporations granted fran-
chises to exercise the condemnation power. Out of those listed, only the owners of
mining claims are truly private parties, the others having to do either with water
transportation or public service. Mine owners, in addition, were granted their own
procedure for condemnation (§§ 888 and 1497, respectively, of those statutes just
cited). This procedure was apparently independent of the codes of civil procedure
in both the 1879 and 1887 compiled statutes. Still, not all corporations had the
power of eminent domain-that is, the franchise to exercise it.
"PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION at 13 (State Pub.
Co. 1889) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. With these words, Mr. L. A. Walker,
Secretary of the Territory of Montana, opened the historic 1889 Montana Constitu-
tional Convention. Note again the initial reference to the mineral wealth of Montana.
2id. at 61. One of the first propositions introduced at the 1889 convention dealt
with irrigation and read:
Proposition 8. Whereas the subject of irrigation is of paramount interest to the
state of Montana, and one which deserves the serious consideration of this con-
vention, as on it depends in a great measure the future prosperity of the agri-
cultural interests of this state. . . . The legislature shall provide for the con-
struction and maintenance of a system of irrigating canals and ditches in this
state. Such canals and ditches to belong forever to the state, and remain under
its direct control. 4
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important. The framers continued throughout the convention to debate
the propriety of a constitutional declaration of the public nature of
water. But, on the basis of a declaration that the use of water was a
public use, already adopted into the Bill of Rights, the declaration of
public ownership of state waters failed and was not included in the
constitution.
24
The discussion of the power of eminent domain was not so easily
disposed of by the framers. Upon its first reading, the proposed eminent
domain section of the 1889 Constitution confusingly contained the lan-
guage that private property could not be taken for private use. 25 While
the framers were not experts on eminent domain, fortunately at least
some recognized the unconstitutionality of the section as it stood upon
first reading.26 A man by the name of J. K. Toole became the most
forceful influence on the law of eminent domain in Montana when he
offered an amendment to § 14 and a new § 15 of the Bill of Rights.27
Those sections, as introduced by Mr. Toole, became §§ 14 and 15 of
Article 3 of the 1889 Montana Constitution. The discussion among the
framers leading to final acceptance of Mr. Toole's amendments clearly
showed the concern for the effective and beneficial use of Montana's
water. The framers realized that without a constitutional declaration
that the use of water was a public use, an adequate supply of water
might never be obtained. 28 Private property simply could not be taken
for private use said the framers; but private property could be taken
for public use. 28 .1 Thus was born the constitutional declaration that the
use of water was for the public use, one for which the power of eminent
domain could be exercised. The debates of the framers were so caught
up with the concern over the use of the state's waters that they are
"PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22 at 895 to 901. Meeting in committee of the whole, the
framers argued the question of the public nature of the state's water on August 13,
1889. The argument centered upon the questions of whether both appropriated and
unappropriated waters could be declared publicly owned without injuring vested
rights to water. Referring to § 15 of the Bill of Rights [MONT. CONST. art. 3, §
15(1889)] which declared that all waters of the state were to be held a public use,
the framers decided to delete a declaration of public ownership. Apparently, some
confusions existed between ownership of the water itself and ownership of the right
to use the water. At least two members of the committee did, however, recognize
that the need for control of the state's waters was of paramount importance. Mr.
Hiram Knowles expressed his concern by stating that public ownership of water
was needed to ensure that the use of water could be controlled and to make sure
that no single person or corporation could over-appropriate the waters of the state.
Id. at 898.
2PRocEEDn-o, supra note 22 at 120. The section was first introduced at the 1889
Convention in the form it had taken in the unsuccessful 1884 Constitution (which,
because Congress failed to act to admit Montana to the Union, was never functional).
On first reading, § 14 read as follows:
§ 14. That private property shall not be taken for private use unless by con-
sent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and except for reser-
voirs, drains, flumes, or ditches on or across lands of others for agriculture,
mining, milling, domestic, or sanitary purposes.
"PROCEEDIOS, supra note 22 at 120.
"'PROCEEmsGS, upra note 22 at 148.
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nearly devoid of discussion of any other use of the condemnation power.
Evidence Mr. Toole's remarks concerning the declaration that the bene-
ficial use of water is a public one:
In order to accomplish desired results, the right of eminent domain
must be invoked to secure the right of way for canals and ditches
and the sites for reservoirs for storage and distribution of water, and
and in order to secure the condemnation of private property for this
purpose, the use to which the property is to be applied must not be
a private but a public use .... [T]he term public use must have a
meaning controlled by the necessity and not that which it generally
bears.'
With the heritage of the territorial laws and a new constitution,
the courts and legislature of Montana next had their hand in defining
and interpreting the law of eminent domain for future generations.
(C) Legislative and Judicial Refinement of Eminent Domain
Since 1889 Montana has seen five re-codifications of the law. The
first was in 1895 and, as far as eminent domain was concerned, was a
continuation of pre-statehood concepts. A broad section recognized the
power of the state to acquire, and to authorize others to acquire, private
property for public use through proceedings in eminent domain.30 The
legislature did just that and granted the right to exercise the power to
railroad corporations,3 ' and apparently to all corporations.8 2 Again, a
separate procedure by which mine owners could secure rights of way
was provided.83 The legislative list of declared public uses was expanded
to include electric power lines, while other declared public uses re-
mained substantially the same as those in territorial days.8 4 The follow-
ing codifications in 1907, 1921, 1935, and 1947 re-enacted the basics of
the older laws with minor changes in language and location within the
codes.
Seemingly seizing upon the attitude of the framers of Montana's
1889 Constitution, the Montana courts proceeded to define the theory
of eminent domain and "public use. '35 One of the first indications of
the judicial attitude characterized by thoughts of economic development
'PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22 at 148. The necessity of obtaining water for irrigation
was the point of Mr. Toole's last phrase in the quoted statement. However, as will
be seen in later portions of this comment, the Montana courts have strdtchcd this
initial interpretation of public use to include exploitation of other natural re"ources,
notably Montana's vast mineral reserves.
5 MONTANA CODES ANNOTATED, POLITICAL CODE, § 63 (1895).
1mid., CrvIL CODE, § 894.
-1d., § 526.
"MONTANA CODEs ANNOTATED, POLITICAL CODE, § 3632 (1895).
"Id., CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 2211. See notes 18, 19 and 21 and the related text.
"See note 29 and the quotation of Mr. Toole in the text of this comment. Two defi-
nitions of "public use" exist today; one is in terms of use by the public, and the
other is defined as public benefit or advantage. Refer to note 49, infra, and the
related text for a discussion of the two distinct theories.
[Vol. 35
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was expressed in 1895 in Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Mont. Union Ry. Co."8
Ironically, the Montana supreme court expressed its desire to "correctly"
expound on the law of eminent domain, then in its infancy in Montana.
7
Unfortunately, the court may have done just the opposite, both in terms
of today's need and in terms of the general view held at the time.88
In the Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co. case, one railroad, the condemnor, sought
to construct spur lines and crossings through the other railroad's existing
right of way as a matter of necessity in reaching a mine. The court
was careful to point out the public character of railroads which were by
statute declared to be common carriers-public service corporations.89
This recognition alone would have been sufficient to sustain the exercise
of the power of eminent domain in that case. The court correctly noted
the constitutional intent that railroads be public highways providing
nondiscriminatory public service.40  This alone would have established
the public's right to use the offered service, thus justifying the taking of
private property for a public use. The court, however, went further.
By citing cases from both Nevada and George4 ' supporting the mining
industry, the court recognized the economic benefit to Montana of foster-
ing the mining industry.42 In due course, the court therefore established
the furtherance of Montana's mining industry as a public use for which
the condemnation power could be exercised.
Without legislative or constitutional authority, the Montana court
had declared that the fostering of mining interests was for the public
benefit or advantage 43-a public use. This attitude has continued to the
"Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Mont. Union Ry. Co., 16 Mont. 504, 41 P. 232 (1895).
"Id. at 238.
MThe opinions of both Mr. Nichols and Mr. Lewis in their separate works on emi-
nent domain would seem to support this assertion. See NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN,
§7.1 at 7-10 and § 7.2[3] at 7-36 (3d ed.); and LEwis, EMINENT DoMAr, § 2 at
3 to 7 (3d ed.).
"Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co., supra note 36 at 238 and 239.
OId. at 239, citing MONT. CONsT. art. 15, §§ 5, 7 (1889).
"Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co., supra note 36 at 239, citing Dayton Gold and Silver Min.
Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 409, 5 Mor. Min. Rep. 424 (1876) which had held that
mining was a proper object of eminent domain because the necessities of mining,
milling, smelting, etc., were of direct interest to the people of that state; and citing
Hand Gold Min. Co. v. Parker, 59 Ga. 420, 424 (1877) where the taking of private
property in aid of the gold and silver mining industry was justified on the ground
that gold and silver were the basis of U.S. currency for the public use.
"Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co., supra note 36 at 241, where the Court noted that mining was
the most important Montana industry, employing the most people and providing
the greater portion of the state's prosperity (but, the year was 1895).
4 The satutes in effect at the time of the decision were those of the 1887 codification,
supra notes 18, 19 and 21; also, the,1889 Constitution had been adopted. Neither
the statutes nor the Constitution had declared mining to be a public use. The list
of legislatively declared public uses was limited to providing roads and water to
and from mines. The Constitution, supra note 24, had declared only the beneficial
use of water to be a public use. Apparently, the Court, supra note 36 at 243, relied
upon a "rule of construction" that the power to take private property for public
use could be exercised only so far as authority extends, either by way of express
law or by clear implication. 7
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present, based upon the theories of at least two U.S. Supreme Court
cases 44 and upon Montana cases similar to that first 1895 case.
45
THE PRESENT
With this somewhat sketchy history in mind,'46 a critical eye must
be turned upon more recent developments and applications of the power
of eminent domain. Before analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of
Montana's views with respect to the exploitation of her natural resources,
one must appreciate the jurisdictional differences of opinion which have
diversified the meaning and application of eminent domain.
EMINENT DOMAIN IN BRIEF
Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take private prop-
erty for public use without the owner's consent.T This is a limited
definition, and one used by most state constitutions. In its pure form,
eminent domain is not defined in terms of public use, but instead in
terms of promoting the public welfare.
4
1
Public use, standing as a constitutional limitation on an otherwise
broad power, has met with much confusing judicial rhetoric. The out-
growth of this rhetoric has been the formation of two distinct theories, 9
or in some writers' opinions, a general rule and an exception. 50 The
more liberal view-public benefit or advantage as a public use-is gen-
erally confined in its application to arid western states rich in mineral
resources.51 At least three western states have specifically rejected the
"Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905) and Strickley v. Highland Boy Min. Co., 200
U.S. 527 (1906). While Clark dealt with condemnation of a right of way for an
irrigation ditch, it did establish, in regions of certain climatic and geographical
conditions, the viability of the public benefit theory of eminent domain upon which
the courts of Montana have relied.
OButte, A. & P. Ry. Co., supra note 36, and Kipp v. Davis-Daly Copper Co., 41 Mont.
509, 110 P. 237, 240 to 241 (1910) and State ex rel. Butte-Los Angeles Min. Co. v.
Dist. Ct., 103 Mont. 30, 60 P.2d 380, 383 (1936). Other expressions of the cor-
porate power of eminent domain and the public benefit version of public use may
be found in: Ellinghouse v. Taylor, 19 Mont. 462, 48 P. 757 (1897); Helena Power
Trans. Co. v. Spratt, 35 Mont. 108, 88 P. 773 (1907); Rutherford v. City of Great
Falls, 107 Mont. 512, 86 P.2d 656 (1939); and State ex rel. Helena Housing Author-
ity v. City Council, 108 Mont. 347, 90 P.2d 514 (1939).
"Those interested in a more expanded discussion of the historical development of
eminent domain should consult NICHOLS, supra note 3, and LEWIs, supra note 10.
An excellent and exhaustive analysis of the condemnation and police powers with
particular reference to land use planning is found in a study written for the Council
on Environmental Quality. See Bosselman, Cauies, and Banta, Tax TAKING ISSUE
(1973) at 50 to 123.
"1NIcHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.11 at 1-5.
"LEwIs, supra note 10, § 1 at 3; see also notes 16 and 17, supra, and the related text.
"NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.2 at 7-22 and 7-26. The two theories of "public use"
may be best expressed by the following: (1) use by the public, or at least a right
to use, and (2) public benefit or advantage which contemplates as a public use
anything which tends to enlarge the productive power of the inhabitants of an area
or which manifestly contributes to the general welfare of the community.
'See annot., 54 A.L.R. 7, 44 to 45 (1928).
mNICHOLS, supra note 49. Among those listed are Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Utah,
Arizona, Colorado, and Wyoming.
[Vol. 35
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public benefit theory and have clung to the strict "use-by-the-public"
doctrine.
52
Clearly, the question as to what constitutes a public use is a judicial
one. 5 3 Even though the legislature may declare its will in the form of
statutes listing public uses, the courts, while giving some deference
to those legislative declarations, still have the ultimate decision. 5 3 J Consid-
ering, however, that the constitutional recognitions of the power of eminent
domain are no more than limitations on the broader power, the courts
in those jurisdictions adopting the more liberal view of public use are
left with indefinable standards by which to judge the facts before them.
By defining the term "public use" as equivalent to public benefit, the
courts have in essence erased the constitutional limitations by which
they are bound. The raw, inherent power of eminent domain does not
exist with the public-use limitation attached.54 The public benefit theory
of public use merely states the law of eminent domain as it existed prior
to constitutional limitation. In those states requiring a showing of the
public's right to use, whether exercised or not, the courts have a clear
constitutional mandate to segregate those uses of condemned property
which would be only private in nature and those which would be public.
55
Regardless, the relative merits of public use versus public benefit need
not be argued here, for many views and explanations exist to which
ready reference may be had.56 The point to be made, however, is that
the public benefit doctrine has and will continue to play an important
role in the exploitation of Montana's natural resources.
MONTANA'S MISTAKES
It appears that the adoption of the public benefit theory in Mon-
tana has led this state down many of the wrong paths. Any proposed
taking of private property without consent of the owner is bound to
be upheld by the Montana courts upon sufficient showing that the
use of the property to be condemned will benefit the public in some
"2California (with respect to mining at least), Oregon, and Washington as evidenced ii
Consolidated Channel Co. v. Central Pao. Ry. Co., 51 Cal. 269, 5 Mor. Min. Rep. 438
(1876); Amador Queen Min. Co. v. Dewitt, 73 Cal. 482, 15 P. 74 (1887); Smith
v. Cameron, 106 Ore. 1, 210 P. 716 (1922); Apex Transp. Co. v. Garbade, 32 Ore. 582,
52 P. 573 (1898); State ex rel. Clark v. Superior Ct., 62 Wash. 612, 114 P. 444
(1911); and Reed v. City of Seattle, 124 Wash. 185, 213 P. 923 (1923).
"L.wis, supra note 10, § 251 at 497 to 499, and NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.225 at
7-181.
"'Id.
"LgwIs, supra note 48.
"All those views just expressed are clearly favored by LEwIs, supra note 10, § 251
at 500 to 509.
mConsult: LEwis, supra note 55; NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.2[3J at 7-36; Carl,
Eminent Domain: A Research Report, at 50 to 59 (1967); annot., 54 A.L.R. 7,
Ferguson v. Ill. Cen. Ry. Co., 202 Iowa 508, 210 N.W. 604 (1926); annot., 54 A.L.R.
56, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago 4 St. Louis Ry. Co., 315 Ill. 461, 146 N.E. 606
(1925); Comment, The Doctrine of Public Use in Eminent Domain in Montana,
9 MONT. L. REv. 53 (1948).
1974]
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significant manner. The adoption of the public benefit theory in Mon-
tana is not the only problem. Its application in Montana has created
additional difficulties.
The list of legislatively prescribed public uses57 has continuously
been added to until it now contains fifteen distinct categories of public
uses which otherwise might be private uses. 58 In the spirit of the 1889
Constitutional Convention, the beneficial use of water was constitutionally
declared to be a public use.59 This public use, because of its constitu-
tional status, is not truly open to criticism. The framers of the 1889
Constitution clearly recognized that private property could not be taken
for private use; so to ensure the favored status of water for irrigation
of Montana's arid lands, they wisely decided to declare that use to be
public.60 By doing so, the framers left no doubt in the minds of the
judges that as long as the other prerequisites of eminent domain were
met, the beneficial use of water was a public use. Such a constitutional
declaration does not exist with respect to the other legislatively declared
public uses. With no other guide to decision than their own judicially
created public benefit doctrine, the courts must examine each set of
facts to determine whether the proposed use will in fact be of public
benefit.
There is no question that the use of condemned property for such
things as the generation and supply of electrical power, the right of
way for railroads and electric power, telephone and telegraph lines,
public highways, etc., are public uses. In each case, the condemnor is
bound to provide the service or use to the public. In each, the public
has at least some right to use the property or the services produced.
In each, one also notes that the condemnor is subject to legislative
(public) regulation and control to some extent. This right of public
use and control through regulation does not exist, however, for at least
one of the legislatively declared public uses-the mining and extraction
of ores and minerals.
61
To further compound the problem already presented, the Montana
legislature, in adopting the Montana Business Corporations Act, granted
to each and every corporation organized thereunder the right to exer-
cise the power of eminent domain. 62 The practical effect of such a
blanket declaration is to transform all private corporations into quasi-
iSee note 19, supra.
SISR&ISED CODES Or MONTANA, § 93-9902 (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947].
SDPROCEEDINGS, supra notes 22 and 24.
-PRocEEDiNGs, supra note 22 at 148 to 149. Mr. Toole, who had introduced that
section of the 1889 Constitution, MONT. CONST. art. 3, § 15 (1889), stated that he
believed that the fundamental law of Montana should speak in no uncertain terms.
By declaring the beneficial use of water to be a public use, he hoped to avoid the
possibility that the courts would not recognize such use as public.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9902(15).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 15-2204(d).
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public corporations. A quasi-public corporation is generally thought of
as a private corporation which has been vested with certain powers
of a public nature--for example, the power of eminent domain.6 3 These
powers are usually granted to enable the corporation to discharge its
duties for the public benefit." Quasi-public corporations, while not
public corporations per se, are commonly known as public service cor-
porations which do not exercise their granted powers solely for profit
or for the benefit of their stockholders.6 5 Generally, public service
corporations derive their powers from a franchise from the state gov-
ernment in order to provide a public necessity or convenience. They are,
in fact, public utilities subject to legislative and administrative regu-
lation.68
If the intent of the legislature was to transform all Montana corpora-
tions into public service corporations, where is the administrative con-
trol and service to the public by which such corporations are character-
ized? The danger inherent in the broad legislative grant of eminent
domain to all Montana corporations should be obvious. Consider the
possible danger to Montana's water and mineral resources. Take, for
example, the Montana mining corporation engaged solely in the business
of extracting minerals from the earth for sale on the market. Faced
with a need for water to operate its mine, the corporation seeks a method
to obtain large quantities of water for its own use. Its first step is the
realization that it has been granted the power of eminent domain.6 7 The
corporation knows that the beneficial use of water is a public use.68
Likewise, land necessary for sites for reservoirs to collect and store
water is a public use.69 Proceeding to the statutory list of public uses,
70
the corporation finds that canals, ditches and flumes for supplying
mines with water71 and for working mines, 7 2 and sites for reservoirs
necessary for collecting and storing water,'  and finally the mining
118 Am. JuR. 2d Corporations, § 9 at 555, citing Attorney General v. Haverhill Gas-
light Go., 215 Mass. 394, 101 N.E. 1061, 1063 (1913), Inter-Ocean Pub. Co. v.
Assoc. Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N.E. 822, 824 (1900), Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach,
37 Cal. 543, 577 (1869).
611d.
OSee 18 Am. Jun. 2d Corporations, supra note 63, citing Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah
142, 235 P. 580, 584 (1925), annot., 40 A.L.R. 230; Arrison v. Company D, 12 N.D.
554, 98 N.W. 83, 84 to 85 (1904); Vaught v. East Tenn. Tele. Co., 123 Tenn. 318,
130 S.W. 1050, 1051 (1910).
0OPrime examples are common carriers such as railroads and other utilities such as
power companies. In Montana, the regulation of such public service corporations is
entrusted to the Public Service Commission. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 70-101 et seq.
rR.C.M. 1947, § 15-2204(d).
6rMONT. CONST. art. 3, § 15 (1889). A discussion of the new 1972 Constitution follows
infra.
Id.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9902.
71Id., subsee. 4.
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and extraction of ores, metals, or minerals74 are all public uses. Armed
with the power and the public uses, the corporation, in a condemnation
proceeding, aproaches the courts which have settled upon a public
benefit or advantage view of public use. What result? Assuming the
existence of the other requisites for the exercise of eminent domain,
75
this hypothetical corporation very likely could secure nearly any quant-
ity of water capable of being put to a beneficial use-and the land
necessary for its storage and transportation-at least prior to 1972.76
THE APPROACH OF OTHER WESTERN STATES
As noted previously, Montana is not the only western state recog-
nizing the public benefit version of public use.77 Montana is apparently
the only western jurisdiction granting to all corporations the power of
eminent domain.
78
Those western states which have adopted the "use-by-the-public"
theory of public use79 have in so doing solved many of the problems in-
herent in the statutory scheme of Montana. In California, for example,
the statutory list of public uses is as exhaustive as Montana's.80 In
California, however, the use sought by a private corporation through
condemnation must be such as will serve the public; that is, the public
must have the option to demand the service of the corporation as of
right, and not according to the corporation's will and pleasure. s ' Thus,
a taking for wholly private enterprise and profit is not allowed even
though the use-such as for mining facilities-is statutorily declared
to be public.8 2 Also, no sweeping grant of the condemnation power to
California corporations exists.8 3 Generally, the same pertains to Oregon
and Washington law on eminent domain.
8 4
1'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9902(15).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9905.
"The year 1972 brought with it a new constitution and the groundwork for a new
water law. Both will be discussed infra.
"See note 51, supra.
7'MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, ANNOTATED (West 1971), annotation § 3.02 at
101. Section 4(d) of the Model Act from which the Montana Act was derived does
not contain the reference to the power of eminent domain.
79See note 52, supra.
OCALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 1238 (West 1964). Among those uses listed
as public are: mining facilities, roads, pipelines, hydroelectric and electric facilities,
gas, heat, refrigeration or power plants, and airports.
"Shasta Power v. Walker, 149 F. 568, 572 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1906).
"Consolidated Channel Co., supra note 52 at 273. See also: Black Rock Placer Min.
Dist. v. Summit Water & Irr., 56 C.A.2d 513, 133 P.2d 58, 62 (1943); Woodruff v.
North Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co., 18 F. 753, 780 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884); and Gen.
Pet. Corp. of Cal. v. Hobson, 23 F.2d 349, 350 (S.D. Cal. 1928).
'Among the powers of a California corporation are the powers to acquire, hold,
lease, encumber, convey, or otherwise dispose of real or personal property. CALI-
FORNIA CORPORATION CODE, § 802 (West 1964). But the right to exercise the power
of eminent domain is not one of the expressed or implied powers of every corpora-
tion in California. Gen. Pet. Corp. of Cal., supra note 82 at 349.
8The Oregon Business Corporation Act, OREGON REVISED STATHMES, § 57.030 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as ORE. REV. STAT.], contains no reference to the power of eminent
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Of those western states following the public benefit theory,8 5 Idaho
has the most extensive list of constitutionally declared public uses. 6
The Idaho Constitution, unlike the 1889 Montana Constitution, also
declares that those uses declared to be public are subject to state con-
trol and regulation. 7 The legislative declarations of public use s, are
not, then, without constitutional basis in Idaho.
Like Idaho, both Wyoming 9 and Colorado90 have listed public uses
in their respective constitutions, though not to the same extent. Wyom-
ing has an extensive statutory article on eminent domain procedures
covering the exercise of the power by state and local governments, and
public utilities,91 railroads,9 2 and for ditches, flumes, roads, pipes, and
power, telephone and telegraph lines, 93 and for certain ways of neces-
sity.9 4 Similarly, Colorado makes specific grants of the power to certain
persons and corporations.9 5 Noticably lacking from the statutes of these
three states is any blanket grant of the power of eminent domain to all
private corporations and any exhaustive lists of public uses not sup-
ported by constitutional declaration.
In Utah, the state constitution does not enumerate public uses.96
The legislature has instead provided a statutory list much in the same
manner as has Montana.9 7 Unlike Montana, Utah has provided juris-
domain, nor does Washington's Business Corporations Act, WASHINGTON REvISD
CODE, § 23A.08.020 (1962) [hereinafter cited as WASH. REV. CODE]. The exercise
of eminent domain by Washington corporations is controlled by WASH. REv. CODE,
§ 8.20.010 which allows condemnation only by those corporations authorized by law
to make such appropriations. Those corporations authorized by law to exercise the
power are set out specifically in other statutes [WASH. REV. CO, § 76.28.010 (boom
companies), § 90.16.100 (corporations conveying water), § 80.32.060 (electric com-
panies), § 81.36.010 (railroad companies), §§ 78.04.010 and 28.77.240 (mining com-
panies), and so on]. Similarly, in Oregon [ORE. REV. STAT., §§ 772.035, 772.040,
772.210, 772.305, 772.405, and 772.410, to name a few]. Like California, Washington
and Oregon have a further check against the corporate exercise of eminent domain
in that they also recognize the "use-by-the-public'' theory of public use, supra note 52.
"See note 51, supra.
"IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 14 (1890). Among them are: reservoirs or storage basins
for irrigation; rights of way for ditches, flumes, pipes, etc., to convey water for
any beneficial purpose; drainage of mines or working of mines by means of roads,
railroads, tramways, cuts, tunnels, etc., or other necessary means to their complete
development; any other use necessary to complete development of the material re-
sources of the state.
87.
I IDAHO CODE ANNOTATED, § 7-701 (1947).
"WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 32 (1890).
9"COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 14 (1876).
9WYOMING STATUTES ANNOTATED, §§ 1-743 et seq. (1957) [hereinafter cited as Wyo.
STAT. ANNO.].
9Id., §§ 1-754 et seq.
WYO. STAT. ANNO, §§ 1-791 et seq.
-WYo. STAT. ANNo., §§ 1-794 et seq.
"COLORADO REVISED STATUTES, §§ 50-2-1 et seq. (1963). See also, rights of way for
designated common carriers (§§ 50-4-1 et seq.) and for certain transmission com-
panies (§ 50-5-1 et seq.).
"UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 22 (1896).
-TTAH CODE ANNOTATED, § 78-34-1 (1953).
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dictional limits on the exercise of the condemnation power for sites for
mills, mines and other works for the reduction of ores.98 These juris-
dictional limits on the exercise of the power for mining or milling pur-
poses apparently have the purpose of restricting vast condemnation in
and around populated areas and of respecting existing contracts be-
tween the condemnor and the land owner.
99
Having briefly considered the statutory and constitutional law of
eminent domain in several western states, a glance must next be taken
at some recent developments in Montana.
MONTANA'S CORRECTIVE MEASURES
Probably the most significant advance toward control of Montana's
natural resources was made in 1972 with the adoption of the new Con-
stitution. With the 1972 Constitution came the long-needed public owner-
ship of water, as well as a directive to the Legislative that it provide
for administration and control of water rights.100 In turn, the 1973 Mon-
tana Legislature enacted the "Montana Water Use Act."''1 1 This Act,
among others of the 1973 session, will have at least an indirect effect
on the power of eminent domain. Following the 1972 constitutional
mandate, the Legislature has also declared the use of water to be a
public use and subject to appropriation for beneficial uses.10 2 The defini-
tion of "beneficial use" includes the use of water for mining purposes
among others. 03 Besides providing for the recognition of existing rights
and a procedure for their final determination,104 the 1973 Legislature
established a permit system, administratively controlled, for the appro-
priation of the unappropriated waters of the State. 0 5 No right to appro-
priate State waters may be obtained by any other method. 06 This
exclusive method of appropriation applies, of course, to unappropriated
-Id., § 78-34-1(13). In Utah, the power of eminent domain cannot be exercised for
mining or milling purposes: (1) in any county whose population exceeds 20,000,
nor within one mile of the city limits of any city; (2) unless the condemnor has
the right to operate, by purchase, option to purchase, or easement, at least 75%
in value of land acreage owned by persons or corporations situated within a radius
of four mills from the mill, smelter, or other similar works; (3) beyond the limits
of that four-mile radius; (4) as to lands covered by contracts, easements, or agree-
ments existing between the condemnor and the owner situated within the four-mile
radius and providing for the operation of such mill, smelter, or other similar works;
and [most importantly] (5) until an action shall have been commenced to restrain
operation of such mill, smelter, or other similar works.
OThe Montana legislature would be well advised to carefully consider the Utah juris-
dictional limits, supra note 98, and similar ones in Oregon, OR. REv. STAT., §
772.405.
I'MONT. CONST. art. 9, § 3 (1972). In addition, the beneficial use of water was
continued as a constitutionally declared public use.
mR.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-865 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
1-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-866(1) (Supp. 1973).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-867(2) (Supp. 1973).
n4R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-870 to 89-879 (Supp. 1973).
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-880 to 89-8-102 (Supp. 1973).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-880(1) (Supp. 1973).
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waters. The condemnation of unappropriated waters, if ever possible,
is surely foreclosed after 1973. The condemnation of existing water
rights, either pre-1973 or post-1973, would appear, however, to be un-
affected by the Act. Since any condemnation of an existing water right
would be no more than a transfer of the right from the original owner
to the condemnor, no new appropriation would be created thereby, and
no permit would be required therefor.107
Mineral speculation-particularly in coal-was also increasing in
1972 in eastern Montana. With inadequate mining laws and the threat
of environmental degradation, the 1973 legislative session passed at
least two acts dealing directly with the problem, the "Strip Mining and
Reclamation Act"' 0 8 and the "Utility Siting Act."'1 9 Of course, neither
of these acts deals directly with the condemnation of private property
for mining or energy generation facilities. The extensive and time-
consuming requirements of these acts with respect to licensing and cer-
tification, environmental protection and reclamation maymor may not
have an indirect effect on condemnation. From a purely psychological
and economic standpoint, the complexities of these acts will undoubtedly
discourage development of coal resources by the unprepared or smaller
developers. The ultimate effect would appear to be the decline in the
exercise of eminent domain by smaller corporations, and in lieu thereof,
the sale or lease of their mineral rights to more economically prepared
and larger operations which could effectively use the condemnation pro-
cedures on a larger scale.
The speculative repercussions of this recent legislation may be some-
what mooted by yet another move by the 1973 Legislature to quiet the
development of Montana's coal reserves. Prior to the announcement
of the so-called "energy crisis" in late 1973 and after much of the land
speculation in eastern Montana was complete, the Legislature signifi-
cantly amended the statutory list of public uses. By excepting from
the definition of "public use" the strip or open pit mining of coal, the
Legislature has foreclosed the use of eminent domain for the acquisition
of coal mining property." 0 The ultimate life of this amendment is in
question. Considering the advent of the "energy crisis" and a legis-
lative policy statement expressed in terms of concern for or lack of
knowledge of the effects of strip mining,"' a logical conclusion would
be that this amendment will be short-lived.
The significance of this discussion with respect to eminent domain
and natural resources is two-fold. A notable change in public or legisla-
11 The transfer of water rights, apparently by any legitimate method, is treated in
the new Act under R.C.M. 1947, § 89-893 (Supp. 1973).
-IR.C.M. 1947, §§ 50-1034 et seq. (Supp. 1973). Reference should also be made to
the "Open Cut Mining Act," R.C.M. 1947, §§ 50-1501 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
1-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 70-801 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
'-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9902(15) (Supp. 1973).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9902.1 (Supp. 1973).
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tive attitude toward administrative control of Montana's natural re-
sources is evidenced by this recent legislation. The trend appears to be
away from the economical justifications for exploitation in the past'12
and toward administratively controlled effective use and reclamation.
Secondly, such a public attitude should impress itself upon the judicial
interpretations and decisions of the future.
THE FUTURE
The future of the use of condemnation in Montana to exploit her
natural resources seems bound in part by judicial precedent set nearly
eighty years ago. 118 While the public benefit doctrine of public use
was adopted at a crucial time of economic growth in Montana, it is
highly probably that the taking of private property for a use which
substantially benefits the public only indirectly has out-lived its use-
fulness. This may be particularly true with respect to Montana's natural
resources-primarily water, minerals and open space. The "energy crisis"
has created an expanded need for all three of these vital resources which
must be used together in order to produce the energy needed for the
future. At present, no one can doubt that Montana is one of very few
states with an abundance of water, minerals and open land, as yet
largely untapped. 1 14 The prospects for exploitation of these resources
should not be met with "panic" legislation to cure an immediate fear,
but should be met with an orderly undertaking to control and ensure
the effective and nondevastating use of these resources for all. For
examples of "panic" legislation to wrongly cure what is, in fact, a long-
range problem, consider the 1973 legislative action which excepted strip
coal mining from public use, 115 and a presently proposed bill in the
1974 legislative session which would place a moratorium on the granting
of permits to appropriate waters of the Yellowstone River Basin.1 6
Regardless of the suspected impropriety of the public benefit theory
based upon today's needs, Montana will likely not abandon it at this
late date. 1 7 Taking this as given, then, suggestions for future legislation
are in order.
'"See notes 36 through 45, supra.
"2Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co., supra note 36.
11A Seattle, Washington, environmental consulting firm has announced that it has
done research and submitted reports on nuclear power generation plant sites in
Montana. The firm said that two unannounced Montana sites had been chosen for
1,100-megawatt light water reactor units in the ". .. promising areas with plentiful
water .... "' See, The Missoulian, February 1, 1974, at 1 col. 3.
"5 R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-9902(15) and 93-9902.1 (Supp. 1973).
n 6The Missoulian, January 30, 1974, at 1 col. 1. Governor Thomas Judge's proposed
moratorium on large diversions of water in the coal-rich region of the Yellowstone
River Basin was introduced into the Montana Senate on January 29, 1974. The bill
appeared, at least initially, slated for passage in the 1974 session and would be at
the maximum a three-year mortorium.
17In fact, the public benefit theory has been reaffirmed by the Montana Supreme
Court at least as late as 1969. See, Montana Power Co. v. Bokma, 153 Mont. 390,
457 P.2d 769, 772 to 773 (1969).
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SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Either the Montana legislature must clearly declare that all Mon-
tana corporations are quasi-public or public service corporations," 8 or
it must repeal that phrase in the Montana Business Corporations Act
granting the power of eminent domain to all corporations." 9 The
impracticality of sufficiently regulating all Montana corporations mili-
tates against the first of these alternatives. The repeal of this unique
and unnecessarily broad grant of the condemnation power should be
preferred by the Legislature. Of course, the right to exercise the power
of eminent domain must exist either by express law or by clear impli-
cation. 20 For this reason, the Legislature must then replace the repealed
phrase with specific grants of the power to truly quasi-public corpora-
tions and to other private corporations specifically enumerated by class.
In this manner, administrative regulation of the exercise of the power,
ultimately for exploitation of natural resources, would be facilitated by
lodging state control in the appropriate sections of the codes. As, for
example, with the electrical utilities and common carriers, the condem-
nation power could be granted in the form of an expressed franchise
in those sections regulating public service corporations.' 21 This is the
method generally followed in granting such franchises to municipal
corporations, for example, even in Montana. 22 It is also a method equally
functional for specified classes of private corporations. It allows the
Legislature to clearly define the limits of such an awesome power as
eminent domain. It, in addition, provides the prospective condemnor
with a clear indication of the scope of his power so that he may rely
upon it in planning his long-range objectives.
If, as a matter of public policy, the fostering of the mining industry
in Montana is deemed to be of substantial public benefit, then the
franchise from the State to exercise the condemnation power to that
end must be clearly defined. Recent legislation, particularly applicable
to the mining and nses of coal, has indicated the Legislature's intent to
secure state regulation of the mining industry. 23 These legislative acts
provide an excellent location within the law to properly grant and limit
the condemnation power with respect to the mining industry. The possi-
bility of strip coal mining as a major producer of badly needed energy
presents a certain degree of territorial uncertainty in populated areas
of the State. The Legislature should carefully consider municipal ter-
ritorial integrity and growth potential in drafting orderly eminent do-
mISee R.C.M. 1947, § 15-2204(d) and the text related to note 62, supra.
n"Id.
'Butte, A. & P. Ry. Co., supra note 36 at 243, and State v. Aitchison, 96 Mont. 335,
30 P.2d 805, 807 (1934).
2R.C.M. 1947, Title 70.
'-ZR.C.M. 1947, § 11-977, which is expressed in terms of the powers of the governing
body.
mR.C.M. 1947, §§ 50-1034 et seq., 50-1501 et seq., and 70-801 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
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main procedures for the mining industry.124 Providing for territorial
limitations on the exercise of eminent domain for mining purposes in
and around municipalities is equally as applicable to open pit mining
as it is to strip mining.
The 1973 Water Use Act1 25 likewise provides the Legislature with
an excellent opportunity to define the scope of condemnation of water
rights and to define those persons or organizations in whom the power
should be placed. This position was urged by at least one commentator
in Montana as early as 1966 with an eye toward what was then a future
water code. 2 6 The fact that often prior beneficial uses of water become
outdated at some point in the technological and economic growth of an
environment provides the basis for the orderly condemnation of land
or its appurtenant water right.127  This obsolescence of prior uses is
equally applicable to advances in environmental or resource preservation
as it is to industrial growth. Surely this obsolescence, dependent upon
public opinion of the function of the applied use, should be met with
sufficiently flexible legislation which will conform to the needs of a
changing economic and social environment.
The implication of each of the above recommendations is the need
for an appropriate state agency (or agencies) 28 to at least initially
regulate the use of the condemnation power for the exploitation of
Montana's natural resources. The administrative control of preferred
uses of water and condemnation, as well as initial appropriation, 29 has
been forcefully advocated. 8 0 Many of the arguments for such control of
water seem to be appropriate for condemnation by the mining industry
"'Excellent examples of this type of contemporary legislation are found in Utah and
Oregon, supra notes 98 and 99.
'iR.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-865 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
'"Comment, Modern Western Legislation as a Pattern for Changes in the Montana
Law of Water Bights, 28 MoNT. L. REv. 95, 111 (1966).
"=Id.
"'Montana is already provided with a competent agency, the Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation, which is vested with the general and newly granted
control of the water and mineral resources of the state. See the "Water Use Act,"
and the "Utility Siting Act," R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-865 et seq., and §§ 70-801 et seq.
(Supp. 1973), respectively. Of equal competence with respect to state land re-
sources is the State Board of Land Commissioners which has been given administra-
tive control of the "Open Cut Mining Act," R.C.M. 1947, §§ 50-1501 et seq. (Supp.
1973) and the "Strip Mining and Reclamation Act," R.C.M. 1947, §§ 50-1034
et seq. (Supp. 1973).
12Assuming that the Department of Natural Resources end Conservation will eventually
be staffed properly and provided with an adequate budget, the Montana Water Use
Act [R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-865 et seq. (Supp. 1973)] should efficiently and uniformly
handle appropriations.
'Comment, supra note 126 at 113, and Yeutter, A Legal-Economic Critique of Nebraska
Watercourse Law, 44 NEB. L. REv. 11, 50 to 51 (1965). Yeutter suggests
economic conditions of the area dictate which uses of water deserve preference
over others. The public should not fear the potential administrative adjustment in
the state's economy, Yeutter explains, for at least two sound reasons applicable here:
(1) the state as a whole will always benefit from a more efficient use of a natural
resource, and (2) displaced permit (water right) holders will not unduly suffer since
preference adjustments will require compensation for the ''taking.'' Id., Yeutter at 52.
[Vol. 35
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 35 [1974], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/ lr/vol35/iss2/5
EMINENT DOMAIN
and by public service corporations. Such administrative control of the
eminent domain franchise is apparently not repugnant to the Constitu-
tion.1' 1 The ultimate in regulation would be to provide for an initial
administrative decision as to the propriety of a proposed taking with
respect to environmental needs and preferences. This administrative de-
cision would be a collective opinion of several persons sharing a degree
of expertise often not available to courts and juries. Provision for ade-
quate notice, opportunity to be heard and to object, and finally for judicial
review should satisfy constitutional due process requirements. The 1973
amendment to the "public use" section of Montana's statutory law on
eminent domain, 132 if taken in the context of a moratorium on its exer-
cise for strip coal mining, provides the Legislature with the needed time
to explore these possibilities.
The basic concept of administrative control of the condemnation
power is not new, nor is it entirely unique. 3 3 The administrative con-
trol of Montana's natural resources has begun. Continuing this policy
of protection of the environment and orderly exploitation of natural
resources is in the interest of all Montanans. By lodging the control of
the exercise of the power of eminent domain in competent state hands,
the Legislature can ensure the adequacy of Montana's water and mineral
resources for the use of all.
SUMMARY REMARKS'
3 4
This comment was introduced with reference to an intricate balanc-
ing of interests that must take place when dealing with valuable natural
resources. The attitudes of the past need not dictate the future. The
complex problems facing the United States and the rest of the world
with respect to energy are dependent in large part on the wise and
orderly use of natural resources. This wise and orderly use in turn de-
pends largely upon the availability of land and water to make present
technological devices functional. The power of eminent domain can play
no small part in tapping Montana's water and mineral resources. It is,
in fact, a valuable tool and one which should be controlled and not
feared. Sufficient administrative control of this power, which has been
aind will be used to exploit Montana's natural resources, should provide
the State with the fulcrum from which interests may be expertly and
uniformly balanced.
mThere is no constitutional requirement that the taking for public use be initioted
in the courts. MONT. CoNsT. art. 2, § 29 (1972).
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-9902(15) and 93-9902.1 (Supp. 1973).
mSee note ,13, supra.
lBecause the "energy crisis" has focused attention on Montana's water and coal
reserves, this discussion of eminent domain as an exploitation tool has necessarily
been limited. Certainly the definition of ''natural resources'' is much broader. The
reader, it is hoped, has been sufficiently referred to other sources of information
which will indirectly broaden the scope of this comment.
1974]
19
Kaze: Eminent Domain: Exploitation Of Montana's Natural Resources
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1974
298 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
Eminent domain is a concept broad enough in definition to adapt
to the times. The method prescribed for its exercise must also meet that
goal. Social, economical and environmental changes in attitude will
result in a shuffled list of "preferred" public uses of natural resources.
State administration of the condemnation power will ensure that the
public remains the dealer. This State's natural resources are far too
valuable to allow the indiscriminate exercise of an awesome power to
facilitate their exploitation solely for profit.
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